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NOTE

ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS OF THE NCAA’S
RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF NAME,
IMAGE, AND LIKENESS OF
STUDENT-ATHLETES
JESSE ADDO*
ABSTRACT
Since its founding, the National Collegiate Athletic Association’s
(“NCAA”) principle of amateurism has drawn a bright line between collegiate and professional sports for the sake of protecting the priority of
higher education and the college experience. For years, the NCAA has
weaponized amateurism to prevent student-athletes from profiting off their
name, image, and likeness (“NIL”). As a result, student-athletes have
sought judicial remedies by bringing suit against the NCAA and its member
institutions. Student-athletes argue that the NCAA and its members are in
violation of federal antitrust laws by conspiring to prevent third parties from
competing in an open and free marketplace and restricting student-athletes
from compensating from their NIL, an infringement on student-athletes’
right of publicity (“ROP”). Consequently, in the past year, state legislatures
including California, Colorado, and Florida have all signed bills into law
which would allow third-party compensation to student-athletes for use of
* Jesse Addo is a 2022 J.D. candidate at the University of St. Thomas School of Law. In
the summer of 2020, Jesse joined Fredrikson & Byron as a summer associate via the Twin Cities
Diversity in Practice (TCDIP) 1L Summer Rotation Clerkship program. Fredrikson is also
partnered with General Mills where Jesse collaborated with the company’s in-house counsel. In
the summer of 2021, Jesse joined Baker McKenzie’s Washington D.C. office as a summer associate working closely with the Corporate & Securities group. Jesse also had a secondment with
FedEx where he worked alongside attorneys within the FedEx Corporate Integrity & Compliance
group to provide recommendations regarding FedEx’s human rights strategy and framework. At
the School of Law, Jesse co-founded the Sports, Entertainment and Media Law Society and serves
as treasurer for the Black Law Student Association. Prior to law school, Jesse spent two years as a
business valuation consultant at Deloitte. “I am indebted to Professor Rachel Paulose for her
encouragement and support in writing this comment. I am also grateful for the research assistance
and helpful comments I received from my writing supervisor, Professor Thomas Berg. This comment would have not been possible without all the Zoom meetings and phone calls Professor Berg
so kindly had with me to make my writing the best it can be.”
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their NIL. Such laws will inevitably present antitrust questions as the
NCAA continues to adhere to a strict concept of amateurism by implementing measures to restrict pay-for-play scenarios between third parties and
student-athletes.
INTRODUCTION
Intercollegiate athletics bring about invaluable opportunities for student-athletes each year. Primarily, student-athletes receive an opportunity to
pursue a bachelor’s degree in a variety of fields and disciplines.1 More than
eight out of ten student-athletes will earn a bachelor’s degree, and more
than 35 percent earn a postgraduate degree.2 Student-athletes also receive
an opportunity to compete at a high level of competition in varsity athletics
at member schools across three divisions of the National Collegiate Athletic
Association (“NCAA”).3 Still, student-athletes are deprived of business and
commercial opportunities which has sparked ongoing controversy in the
NCAA and state legislatures. The legal implications that will arise from
issues around compensation to student-athletes for use of their name, image, and likeness (“NIL”) will surely leave a lasting impact on the world of
college athletics as we know it.
NIL are the three components that make up the legal concept known as
“right of publicity” (“ROP”).4 ROP involves instances where permission is
required of a person to use their NIL.5 For example, permission is not required for a sports blog to publish a photo of a student-athlete competing in
a sport. The legal copyright belongs to the photographer, not the studentathlete pictured.6
The regulations on how student-athletes may use their NIL have garnered attention from lawmakers and have fueled controversy amongst the
NCAA and its stakeholders in the past year. In 2020, student-athlete NIL
has been an issue at the forefront of the NCAA Board of Governors—the
NCAA’s highest governing body who ultimately determines what changes
the NCAA can and should make to better support student-athletes.7 The
Board of Governors is comprised of college administrators including university presidents, conference commissioners, athletic directors, and other
1. See Student-Athletes, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, http://www.ncaa.org/studentathletes (last visited Sept. 2, 2021).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See Jonathan Faber, A Brief History of the Right of Publicity, RIGHT OF PUBLICITY, https:/
/rightofpublicity.com/brief-history-of-rop (last visited Sept. 28, 2021).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See Stacey Osburn, Board of Governors Moves Toward Allowing Student-Athlete Compensation for Endorsements and Promotions, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N (Apr. 29,
2020), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/board-governors-moves-towardallowing-student-athlete-compensation-endorsements-and-promotions.
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relevant stakeholders.8 At its meeting in April 2020, the Board of Governors supported rule changes to allow student-athletes to receive compensation for third-party endorsements both related to and separate from
athletics.9 The Board of Governors also supported compensation for other
student-athlete opportunities, such as social media businesses and personal
appearances within the “guiding principles” originally outlined by the board
in October 2019.10 Some of the NCAA’s guiding principles include:
• Protecting the recruiting environment by prohibiting inducements to select, remain at, or transfer to a specific member
school;
• Assuring student-athletes are treated similarly to non-athlete
students unless a compelling reason exists to differentiate;
• Maintaining the priorities of education and the collegiate experience to provide opportunities for student-athlete success;
• Making clear that compensation for athletic performance or
participation is impermissible;
• Reaffirming that student-athletes are students first and not employees of the university; and
• Making clear the distinction between collegiate and professional opportunities.11
While student-athletes would be permitted to identify themselves by sport
and school, the use of conference and school logos, trademarks, or other
involvement would not be allowed in any endorsements with third parties.12
The board has also emphasized that at no point should a university or college pay student-athletes for NIL activities, a model the NCAA fiercely
opposes, referred to as “pay-for-play.”13
As of the date of publication, the NCAA’s three divisions have
adopted new NIL rules for the 2021–22 academic year pursuant to the
Board’s recommendations.14 The Board is requiring “guardrails”—or restrictions—around several NIL activities. Such restrictions may include
barring NIL activities that would be considered pay-for-play, restricting
school or conference involvement in securing endorsement deals for student-athletes, prohibiting the use of NIL for recruiting purposes by schools
or boosters, and regulating the use of agents and advisors.15
8. See NCAA Board of Governors, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, http://
www.ncaa.org/governance/committees/ncaa-board-governors (last visited Sept. 2, 2021).
9. Osburn, supra note 7.
10. Osburn, supra note 7.
11. Osburn, supra note 7.
12. Osburn, supra note 7.
13. Osburn, supra note 7.
14. Osburn, supra note 7.
15. See Questions and Answers on Name, Image and Likeness, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC
ASS’N, http://www.ncaa.org/questions-and-answers-name-image-and-likeness (last visited Sept. 2,
2021).
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Ultimately, when the NCAA’s proposal regarding student-athletes
compensated for third-party use of their NIL takes effect, one key question
will be analyzed: whether the NCAA’s adoption of broad or undefined restrictions on businesses seeking to compensate student-athletes for use of
their NIL would make them vulnerable to federal antitrust lawsuits brought
by student-athletes and third parties. Broad or undefined restrictions may be
too ambiguous and burdensome in determining what class of businesses are
excluded from doing business with student-athletes and may create an unreasonable restraint of trade.16 Therefore, student-athletes and third parties
are likely to challenge such restrictions as a violation of federal antitrust
laws, particularly the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 (“Sherman Act”).
Considering federal law, binding and persuasive authority, and the
competitive interests of all market participants on the two key issues of
student-athlete NIL, the NCAA will not be allowed to implement broad or
undefined restrictions on businesses seeking to compensate student-athletes
for use of their NIL.
ANALYSIS
Antitrust implications are the most imperative legal challenge the
NCAA faces in its battle to preserve amateurism and restrict student-athletes from profiting from use of their NIL. The operative question is
whether the NCAA’s implementation of broad or undefined restrictions to
exclude businesses seeking to compensate student-athletes for use of their
NIL will be too burdensome on competition and an unreasonable restraint
of trade. The Sherman Act is the governing federal antitrust statute enacted
to prohibit activities that restrict interstate commerce and competition in the
marketplace.17 Under Section One of the Sherman Act, “[e]very contract,
combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce . . . is
declared to be illegal.”18 “The main purpose of Section One is to disallow
conspiracies between businesses that would ultimately harm consumers by
causing higher prices in connection with goods and services and the creation and dissemination of inferior products and services that result from
illegal restraints of trade.”19
In a Section One Sherman Act claim, if the alleged antitrust violation
is not per se illegal, the challenged violation is analyzed under the rule of
16. See PRACTICAL L. ANTITRUST, SECTION 1 OF THE SHERMAN ACT: OVERVIEW (2021),
Westlaw W-016-3376.
17. See The Antitrust Laws, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competi
tion-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws (last visited Sept. 2, 2021).
18. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 117-38); see also DARREN
HEITNER, HOW TO PLAY THE GAME: WHAT EVERY SPORTS ATTORNEY NEEDS TO KNOW 151 (1st
ed. 2014).
19. HEITNER, supra note 18, at 151–52; see also 15 U.S.C.A. § 1.
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reason.20 The rule of reason is a legal doctrine of antitrust law the courts use
to analyze Section One to determine whether an activity unreasonably restrains trade or otherwise has an anticompetitive effect. Under the rule of
reason, a burden-shifting test is utilized to evaluate whether a challenged
antitrust violation substantially suppresses or destroys competition.21 After
the rule of reason is applied through the burden-shifting test, courts determine whether “the anticompetitive effect of the conduct outweighs any
procompetitive benefit.”22
I.

IN ORDER TO PROVE A SECTION ONE VIOLATION, IT MUST BE
ESTABLISHED THAT THE NCAA’S RESTRICTIONS INVOLVE
INTERSTATE COMMERCE AND TWO OR MORE
PARTIES

In order to determine whether a given activity can be challenged under
antitrust law, two threshold prongs must be met:23 “First, because antitrust
is governed under federal law, the initial step to any antitrust analysis
should begin with a determination that the issue in question involves interstate commerce.”24 Second, there must be a showing that there are two or
more parties involved with the alleged antitrust violation.25 Applying the
two prongs to the NCAA’s broad or undefined restrictions on businesses
seeking to compensate student-athletes for use of their NIL, excluded third
parties and student-athletes will likely be successful in bringing a valid antitrust claim against the NCAA for excluding certain businesses from doing
business with student-athletes.
A. The NCAA’s broad or undefined restrictions on businesses involve
interstate commerce.
The first step in the analysis is to determine whether the NCAA’s restrictions on third parties involve interstate commerce. In other words, the
alleged antitrust violation must involve an economic activity that involves
two or more states. The rationale behind the first prong “is that Congress is
not at liberty to regulate activities that take place solely within the borders
of one state.”26 The Commerce Clause generally confers Congress with the
exclusive power to regulate interstate commerce.27 The Supreme Court
gives an unequivocally broad scope to the government’s regulation under
20. PRACTICAL L. ANTITRUST, ANTITRUST RULE OF REASON (2021), Westlaw 9-522-6396
(citing Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006)).
21. Nat’l Soc’y of Pro. Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978).
22. PRACTICAL L. ANTITRUST, supra note 20 (citing Clorox Co. v. Sterling Winthrop, Inc.,
117 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 1997)).
23. HEITNER, supra note 18, at 152.
24. HEITNER, supra note 18, at 152.
25. HEITNER, supra note 18, at 152; see Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006).
26. HEITNER, supra note 18, at 152.
27. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
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the Commerce Clause.28 The commerce power of Congress is limited to
three broad categories: (1) the channels of interstate commerce (e.g. interstate shipment of goods), (2) the instrumentalities of interstate commerce
(e.g. railroads), and (3) activities that substantially affect interstate commerce (e.g. agriculture).29 Regarding the third category, the Supreme Court
has ruled that courts only need to determine whether Congress has a “rational basis” for concluding that an activity has substantially affected interstate commerce.30 The key question then is whether an activity in the
aggregate—the whole class of instances—rationally affects interstate
commerce.31
With respect to the NCAA’s broad or undefined restrictions on businesses seeking to compensate student-athletes for their NIL, the alleged antitrust violation would involve interstate commerce because such an activity
would be regulated under the Commerce Clause as it substantially affects
interstate commerce. Businesses seeking to contract with student-athletes
for use of their NIL may operate in a myriad of industries across the United
States. Similarly, the NCAA has over a thousand member schools all across
the country with at least one member school in every state.32 Further, the
NCAA is an organization that regulates intercollegiate athletics.33 Intercollegiate athletics by its very nature affects interstate commerce as member
schools from all around the United States compete against each other in
various sporting events each year, many of which are nationally broadcast
or otherwise involve economic activities.
Lastly, applying the rational basis standard, courts would likely construe the NCAA’s broad or undefined restrictions on businesses as an activity that substantially affects interstate commerce. The rational basis
standard considers whether Congress acts rationally in determining a class
of activities to be an essential part of a larger regulatory scheme.34 Congress
would act rationally in determining that the broad or undefined restrictions
on businesses from compensating student-athletes is a class of activities that
is an essential part of a larger regulatory scheme. There are more than
480,000 NCAA student-athletes.35 By implementing broad or undefined restrictions on businesses, the NCAA excludes companies from accessing a
large potential market. Such a restriction would be harmful to businesses
28. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 121–22 (1942).
29. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995).
30. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 2 (2005).
31. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557.
32. See What is the NCAA?, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, http://www.ncaa.org/about
/resources/media-center/ncaa-101/what-ncaa (last visited Sept. 3, 2021).
33. Id.
34. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556–57.
35. See 2020-21 GUIDE FOR THE COLLEGE-BOUND STUDENT-ATHLETE, NAT’L COLLEGIATE
ATHLETIC ASS’N 2 (2020), http://fs.ncaa.org/Docs/eligibility_center/Student_Resources/
CBSA.pdf#:~:text=there%20are%20more%20than%20480%2C000,less%20than%202%25%20go
%20pro.
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and consumers in a free market. Additionally, the broad or undefined restrictions on businesses would adversely affect student-athletes by barring
opportunities for them to profit from the use of their NIL. Thus, because the
alleged antitrust violation involves economic activities between two or
more states, and because the courts would reasonably have a rational basis
for concluding that the alleged antitrust violation substantially affects interstate commerce, the first prong is satisfied.
B. The broad or undefined restrictions on businesses involve two or
more parties.
The purpose of antitrust law is to prevent organizations from colluding
to create a state of unfair competition in the marketplace that harms consumers and employees.36 Yet, it is impossible for an organization to collude
with itself.37 Thus, the second prong that must be met—in order to determine whether the NCAA’s broad or undefined restrictions on businesses
can be challenged as an antitrust violation—is whether such an activity involves two or more parties. It is quite apparent that the NCAA’s broad or
undefined restrictions on businesses involves more than two parties. The
most relevant stakeholders in the alleged antitrust violation may include the
NCAA, third-party businesses, student-athletes, and consumers. Because
there is an apparent showing of two or more parties involved in the alleged
antitrust violation, the second prong is satisfied. Thus, excluded third parties and student-athletes can challenge the alleged antitrust violation under
antitrust law.
II. UNDER THE RULE OF REASON ANALYSIS, THE BROAD OR UNDEFINED
RESTRICTIONS ON BUSINESSES UNREASONABLY IMPAIRS
COMPETITION
Since a showing of a Section One violation has been established, the
next step in the antitrust analysis of the NCAA’s broad or undefined restrictions on businesses is an analysis under the rule of reason.38 Courts apply
the rule of reason through a burden-shifting test: (1) The plaintiff bears the
initial burden of showing that the challenged restraint harms competition;
(2) If the plaintiff succeeds, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that
its behavior has procompetitive justifications; (3) If the defendant can establish a justification, the plaintiff has the opportunity to show that; (a) the
restraint is not necessary to achieve the procompetitive goal; or (b) the goal
can be achieved in a less restrictive way.39
36.
37.
38.
39.

See
See
See
See

Clorox Co. v. Sterling Winthrop, Inc., 117 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 1997).
Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 764 (1984).
PRACTICAL L. ANTITRUST, supra note 20.
PRACTICAL L. ANTITRUST, supra note 20.
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A. Through a market analysis, excluded businesses and student-athletes
would establish that the NCAA’s broad or undefined
restrictions harm competition.
The rule of reason analysis begins with the “harm of competition” factor.40 A plaintiff bears the burden of proving that a defendant’s action has
or will substantially impair competition.41 In this case, excluded third parties and student-athletes will bear the burden of proving that the NCAA’s
broad or undefined restrictions on businesses will substantially impair competition. A plaintiff can establish harm to competition through a “market
analysis.”42 The market analysis requires: (1) defining the relevant market,
(2) demonstrating the defendant had market power in the relevant market,
and (3) showing the challenged restraint had a substantial adverse effect on
competition.43
First, “[a] relevant market has a product component and a geographic
component.”44 We begin with the product component. To define the relevant product market, excluded third parties and student-athletes must identify both the NCAA’s product at issue and all the products that substantially
compete with it.45 Here, the “product” at issue is not necessarily a product
offered in the sense of a traditional marketplace. Rather, the product at issue
is the NIL of NCAA student-athletes. Moreover, the products that substantially compete with the NIL of NCAA student-athletes would be those products that are reasonably interchangeable with it.46 Therefore, some may
argue that the NIL of student-athletes competing in other college athletic
associations such as the National Junior College Athletic Association (“NJCAA”), the National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics (“NAIA”), and
the United States Collegiate Athletic Association (“USCAA”) would be
deemed products that substantially compete with the NIL of NCAA student-athletes. However, this argument is rather weak. The NCAA has a far
greater number of student-athletes than any other college athletic association, which translates to a larger market share.47 Additionally, NCAA student-athletes compete at higher levels of competition and NCAA member
schools are significantly more recognizable than their counterparts in the
NAIA or USCAA.48 Because NCAA student-athletes compete at schools
that are significantly more recognizable, with higher levels of competition,
40. See PRACTICAL L. ANTITRUST, supra note 20.
41. See PRACTICAL L. ANTITRUST, supra note 20.
42. Tops Mkt., Inc. v. Quality Mkts. Inc., 142 F.3d 90, 96 (2d Cir. 1998).
43. Id. at 96–97.
44. PRACTICAL L. ANTITRUST, supra note 20.
45. PRACTICAL L. ANTITRUST, supra note 20 (citing Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370
U.S. 294, 325 (1962)).
46. See PRACTICAL L. ANTITRUST, supra note 20; see also Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 325.
47. See generally Christina Gough, College Sports (NCAA) – Statistics & Facts, STATISTA
(June 29, 2021), https://www.statista.com/topics/1436/college-sports-ncaa.
48. Id.
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an objective argument could be made that the NIL of NCAA student-athletes is more valuable because of the marketability of the NCAA studentathlete.
Second, in defining the relevant market, a plaintiff must define the
relevant geographic component. To define the relevant geographic market,
excluded third parties and student-athletes should identify the area in which
the NCAA operates and where customers can obtain the product at issue.49
Here, although the NCAA is headquartered in Indianapolis, Indiana, the
NCAA is a member-led organization with 1,098 member schools across the
United States.50 Therefore, because the NCAA operates in every U.S. state,
student-athletes’ NIL is also located in every U.S. state. Next, third parties
are market participants for the use of the NIL of student-athletes, it can be
reasonably concluded that they are customers for the sake of this analysis.51
Thus, because there is a presence of NCAA student-athletes in every U.S.
state, it can be concluded that third parties can obtain the use of the NIL of
student-athletes in every U.S. state. Therefore, the first element has been
defined here.
The second element of the market analysis is demonstrating the defendant had market power in the relevant market. “Courts require a showing of
market power because unless the defendant has the power to profitably raise
prices or reduce output, it will not be able to harm consumer welfare.”52
“Market share is often considered a proxy for market power” in a market
analysis.53 “The higher a defendant’s market share, the more likely the
courts will find that the defendant has market power in a market analysis.”54
“Courts generally do not find market power for Section One purposes if a
defendant has less than 30 percent of the relevant market.”55
Here, the NCAA undoubtedly has a substantial market share of student-athletes. The NCAA is the largest collegiate athletic association with
more than 500,000 student athletes competing across nearly 1,100 colleges
and universities.56 The next largest collegiate athletic association is the
NAIA, with approximately 60,000 student athletes across 525 athletic pro49. See PRACTICAL L. ANTITRUST, supra note 20 (citing United States v. Philadelphia Nat’l
Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 359 (1963)).
50. See 2020-21 GUIDE FOR THE COLLEGE-BOUND STUDENT-ATHLETE, supra note 35.
51. See Ross Dellenger, NCAA NIL Proposal Prohibits College Athletes from Using School
Logo, Endorsing Certain Businesses and More, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Sept. 14, 2020), https://
www.si.com/college/2020/09/14/ncaa-survey-proposal-name-image-likeness.
52. PRACTICAL L. ANTITRUST, supra note 20 (citing New York v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 811
F. Supp. 848, 871 (E.D.N.Y. 1993)).
53. PRACTICAL L. ANTITRUST, supra note 20 (citing Assam Drug Co. v. Miller Brewing Co.,
798 F.2d 311, 318 (8th Cir. 1986)).
54. PRACTICAL L. ANTITRUST, supra note 20.
55. PRACTICAL L. ANTITRUST, supra note 20 (citing Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v.
Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 26–29 (1984)).
56. See 2020-21 GUIDE FOR THE COLLEGE-BOUND STUDENT-ATHLETE, supra note 35, at 2.
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grams.57 The substantial number of NCAA student-athletes across the
United States practically dwarves the number of student-athletes in other
collegiate athletic associations like the NJCAA and the NAIA. Additionally, because third parties seek to compensate student-athletes for use of
their NIL due to the high marketability of some NCAA student-athletes, the
value of the NIL of a student-athlete may be directly related to their level of
marketability.58 Because NCAA student-athletes attend significantly more
popular, prestigious, and recognizable institutions, NCAA student-athletes
are more marketable than student-athletes of other collegiate athletic associations.59 Thus, the courts would reasonably conclude that the NCAA
has a significantly higher market share and that the NCAA has far greater
than 30 percent of the relevant market. Excluded third parties and studentathletes would reasonably establish that the NCAA possesses market power
in the relevant market. The second element is clearly present here.
The third element of the market analysis requires a plaintiff to show
that the challenged antitrust violation has or will have a substantial adverse
effect on competition.60 Generally, harm to a competitor is not sufficient.
Rather, a plaintiff must show that the defendant’s conduct diminishes overall competition and decreases consumer welfare.61
Here, the broad or undefined restrictions on businesses diminishes
overall competition and decreases consumer welfare. The NCAA’s broad or
undefined restrictions on businesses diminishes overall competition in the
marketplace because authorized third parties may be permitted to utilize the
NIL of student-athletes while excluded businesses may not because of arbitrary restrictions. This will create an unfair competitive advantage in the
marketplace for authorized third parties.
The NCAA will counter by arguing that overall competition will not
be affected because the broad or undefined restrictions on businesses will
have no effect on the sales of products or services. However, this argument
will fail as the relevant market defined in the first element pertains to the
use of the NIL of student-athletes as the product at issue. The product at
issue is not defined as the innumerable products and services that third parties offer consumers, but rather the use of a student-athlete’s NIL. Also,
since the exclusions of certain businesses will not necessarily be limited to
any particular industry, there is potential for unfair competitive advantages
for authorized third parties in a wide range of industries. Thus, overall competition in many different industries could potentially be diminished if the
57. See College USA, ATHLETES ABROAD, https://athletesabroad.se/college-athletics (last visited Sept. 7, 2021).
58. See HEITNER, supra note 18.
59. See 25 Best Colleges for Student Athletes, AFFORDABLE SCHOOLS (Feb. 2019), https://
affordableschools.net/25-best-american-colleges-student-athletes.
60. K.M.B. Warehouse Distribs., Inc. v. Walker Mfg. Co., 61 F.3d 123, 128 (2d Cir. 1995).
61. Id.
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NCAA were to implement broad or undefined restrictions on businesses
seeking to compensate student-athletes for use of their NIL.
Although NCAA Division I student-athletes often receive athletic
scholarships, many could use the additional earning power from compensation for use of their NIL to financially assist themselves and their families.
For instance, NCAA student-athletes reportedly do not have enough pocket
money to afford food outside of their meal plans, and will at times go to bed
hungry, while the NCAA and its affiliates profit from collegiate competition.62 Athletic scholarships offer a large discount to student-athletes financing an education that can total hundreds of thousands of dollars, yet
athletic scholarships still do not cover all of the expenses and costs of living
for a college student.63
Consumer welfare will also decrease given the broad or undefined restrictions on businesses seeking to compensate student-athletes for use of
their NIL. The consumer experience will unduly be affected with the
NCAA’s broad or undefined restrictions on certain businesses and the authorization of others. Many NCAA student-athletes, and college sports
more generally, have a large impact and influence in the various regions,
states, cities, towns, and communities across the United States.64 The perceived economic and non-economic impact of student-athletes and college
sports have been measured through job creation, infrastructure improvement, image promotion, crime and deviancy reduction, and other relevant
measures.65 Student-athletes are generally familiar and relatable to consumers in the community because they are consumers in their respective
communities.
Further, the influence of student-athletes in endorsements and promotions will more than likely have a profound effect on consumers given the
billions of dollars that are already pumped into NCAA athletics each year.66
This is evidenced by celebrity endorsements and other highly recognized
people being a very common marketing technique. “When a familiar face
promotes a product, it makes it seem as if the product itself is familiar,
which makes people more likely to buy it.”67 “Because of the concept of
62. See Sara Ganim, UConn Guard on Unions: I Go to Bed ‘Starving’, CNN (Apr. 8, 2014),
https://www.cnn.com/2014/04/07/us/ncaa-basketball-finals-shabazz-napier-hungry/index.html.
63. Id.
64. See David Larimore, Ph.D. & George Chitiyo, Ph.D., Non-Economic Societal Impacts of
Intercollegiate Athletics, THE SPORT J. (Mar. 14, 2008), https://thesportjournal.org/article/non-economic-societal-impacts-of-intercollegiate-athletics.
65. Id.
66. See Colin Dwyer, NCAA Plans to Allow College Athletes to Get Paid for Use of Their
Names, Images, NPR (Oct. 29, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/10/29/774439078/ncaa-startsprocess-to-allow-compensation-for-college-athletes#:~:text=the%20NCAA%20has%20reported
%20annual,Division%201%20men’s%20basketball%20tournament.
67. Jeff Stibel, Brain Science: Here’s Why You Can’t Resist Celebrity Endorsements, USA
TODAY (Nov. 3, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/columnist/2017/11/03/brain-science-heres-why-you-cant-resist-celebrity-endorsements/827171001.
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familiarity, seeing a celebrity arouses our emotions. It connects us to the
product and makes it memorable.”68 Since student-athletes may become
“celebrities” in their own respect in their college towns and communities,
people become familiar with student-athletes which allows their endorsements and promotions to be more effective. Therefore, the NCAA’s broad
or undefined restrictions on businesses would adversely impact the welfare
of the average consumer by restricting the number of opportunities for consumers to engage with student-athletes and the businesses and brands that
contract with student-athletes for use of their NIL.
The NCAA will refute this argument by suggesting that consumer welfare will only increase with authorized third parties permitted to use the
NIL of student-athletes. The NCAA will argue that the broad or undefined
restrictions on businesses would have either a positive or no effect on consumer welfare because consumers in the market of those excluded businesses would not have alternative opportunities to engage with studentathletes via endorsement and promotion. However, the NCAA fails to recognize that by excluding businesses through the implementation of broad or
undefined restrictions, the NCAA is reducing the output and potential sales
of excluded businesses as well as decreasing the welfare of student-athletes
who are also consumers. Still, even if the NCAA keeps its ban, the players
might have ROP interests to sue and stop businesses from using their NIL
without consent. Student-athletes couldn’t demand compensation for their
consent. But, if student-athletes were going to school in a state where they
have a ROP, they could still stop such NIL use. Consequently, the NCAA’s
restrictions do not necessarily ensure that businesses will be able to use
their NIL. Still, if not for the NCAA’s broad or undefined restrictions on
businesses, excluded businesses may lose out on the opportunity to engage
with consumers in the community in a wide range of industries.
For the reasons above, the broad or undefined restrictions on businesses results in reduced opportunities for student-athletes to be compensated for their NIL. The potential loss of compensation decreases the
welfare of student-athletes as consumers. Thus, because the NCAA’s broad
or undefined restrictions on businesses will likely diminish overall competition in the marketplace and decrease consumer welfare, the challenged antitrust violation will have a substantial adverse effect on competition. Hence,
excluded businesses and student-athletes will likely make a sufficient showing of the three elements of the market analysis.

68. Id.
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B. The NCAA would likely establish a procompetitive justification for
the implementation of broad or undefined restrictions on
businesses.
If the plaintiff succeeds in showing that the challenged antitrust violation harms competition, the second factor under the rule of reason analysis
shifts the burden to the defendant to provide a procompetitive justification
for the restraint.69 Therefore, the NCAA bears the burden of showing a
procompetitive justification for the broad or undefined restrictions on businesses seeking to compensate student-athletes for use of their NIL. As a
general rule, the justification must relate to competition. The exception to
the rule is that explanations dealing solely with public safety or public interest are generally not sufficient.70 Courts have found various justifications
acceptable including enhanced efficiency,71 increased output, and reduced
price.72 Courts generally require defendants to produce evidence that the
restraint actually achieves the procompetitive benefit claimed.73
The NCAA must make a showing that its broad or undefined restrictions on businesses would enhance procompetitive efficiencies, increase
output, and reduce the price of the use of student-athletes’ NIL. Still, the
NCAA must proffer evidence that shows that the NCAA’s exclusions actually achieve the procompetitive effects described.
A key procompetitive justification promulgated by the NCAA is the
assertion that by excluding certain businesses from doing business with student-athletes, a procompetitive purpose is served by preserving the popularity of college sports as a product distinct from professional sports.74 The
integration of academics and athletics enables the NCAA to preserve its
character while uniquely marketing itself.75 Additionally, this procompetitive purpose is reflected in the NCAA’s strict concept of amateurism which
courts have recognized and favored.76 The courts have found that the
NCAA’s current rules serve a procompetitive benefit by promoting the understanding of amateurism, which in turn helps preserve consumer demand
for college sports.77 Therefore, because the courts have ruled in favor of
this procompetitive justification, the NCAA would likely succeed in arguing that the broad or undefined restrictions on businesses promote this goal.
69. Capital Imaging Assocs., P.C. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs., 996 F.2d 537, 543 (2d
Cir. 1993).
70. Nat’l Soc’y of Pro. Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 695.
71. Paladin Assocs. v. Mont. Power Co., 328 F.3d 1145, 1157 (9th Cir. 2003).
72. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1979).
73. Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928, 938 (7th Cir. 2000).
74. O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1073 (9th Cir. 2015).
75. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101–02
(1984).
76. Id. at 103.
77. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1059.
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The NCAA would also argue that the broad or undefined restrictions
on businesses would enhance the procompetitiveness of various industries
that third parties operate in because the exclusions would encourage excluded businesses to seek alternative means of promotion and endorsement.
The NCAA would show that this creates a procompetitive effect of efficiency as consumers in smaller markets will receive opportunities to engage
with NCAA student-athletes contracted with authorized third parties, as
well as student-athletes from other collegiate athletic associations contracted with excluded businesses. The NCAA would likely go on to argue
that such exclusions would create opportunities for student-athletes in other
collegiate athletic associations, such as the NAIA, to be compensated for
use of their NIL by excluded businesses. Further, the NCAA would argue
that the broad or undefined restrictions on businesses would generally increase output, measured by the amount of total student-athlete promotion
and endorsement deals. The NCAA would also show that because the exclusions would serve to “open up the market” for the use of a studentathlete’s NIL, the exclusions would naturally reduce the price of the use of
a student-athlete’s NIL, measured by the fair market value of compensation.
The NCAA’s argument is based on the trend of other collegiate athletic
associations’ legislation.78
On October 6, 2020, the NAIA passed the first legislation of its kind in
college sports to allow its student-athletes the opportunity to be compensated for use of their NIL.79 The NAIA legislation allows a student-athlete
to receive compensation for promoting any commercial product, enterprise,
or for any public or media appearance.80 The NCAA would likely use the
NAIA’s recent legislation regarding student-athlete compensation for use of
NIL as evidence of this procompetitive effect. In light of the recent NAIA
legislation, the NCAA would argue that because other collegiate athletic
associations are now permitting their student-athletes to be compensated for
use of their NIL, the NCAA’s broad or undefined restrictions on businesses
enhance procompetitive efficiencies in the market as excluded businesses
could seek to contract with student-athletes from other collegiate athletic
associations.
However, the NCAA’s potential argument ignores the fact that NCAA
student-athletes are far more marketable than student-athletes of other collegiate athletic associations due to the number of resources and exposure
NCAA student-athletes receive. For instance, an NCAA student-athlete’s
NIL may carry far more value than the NIL of a student-athlete from an
NAIA institution. The NCAA’s argument is grounded in the assumption
78. See NAIA Passes Landmark Name, Image and Likeness Legislation, NAT’L ASS’N OF
INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS (Oct. 6, 2020), https://www.naia.org/general/2020-21/releases/NIL_
Announcement.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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that the NIL of all student-athletes is equal, yet it can be reasonably argued
that the NIL of NCAA student-athletes carry much more weight and value
due to larger athletic budgets, resources, and national exposure.
Ultimately, the NCAA may provide a reasonable procompetitive justification that the broad or undefined restrictions on businesses enhance market efficiency for the use of NIL of student-athletes and increases the
number of opportunities for student-athletes of all athletic associations to be
compensated for use of their NIL. The courts have held that “in order to
preserve the character and quality of the ‘product,’ student-athletes must not
be paid, must be required to attend class, and the like.”81 Except, “the integrity of the ‘product’ cannot be preserved except by mutual agreement; if an
institution adopted such restrictions unilaterally, its effectiveness as a competitor on the playing field might soon be destroyed.”82 The NCAA, therefore, plays a vital role in enabling collegiate athletics to preserve its
character. As a result, it enables a product to be marketed which might
otherwise be unavailable.83 Thus, the NCAA would establish a legitimate
procompetitive justification for the alleged antitrust violation.
C. The broad or undefined restrictions on businesses can be achieved
in a less restrictive way.
Under the rule of reason, once a defendant has established a legitimate,
procompetitive justification, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show
that the procompetitive goal could be achieved by a less restrictive alternative.84 As a general rule, a plaintiff must show that the less restrictive option
would have a substantially lesser impact on competition.85 The exception to
the rule is that the practice need not be the least restrictive option to be
legal.86 If the challenged conduct is necessary to achieve the procompetitive
goal, it is upheld.87 The Supreme Court has held that the NCAA preserving
competitive balance within its own members does not make restrictions on
business with third parties tailored to such a procompetitive goal.88 Moreover, assuming that the justification is legitimate, the courts generally view
“that any contribution . . . made to athletic balance could be achieved by
less restrictive means.”89 In NCAA v. Univ. of Oklahoma, the Court held
that the NCAA’s television plan on its face constituted a restraint of the
operation of a free market, and the restraints were not justified on the basis
81. McCormack v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 845 F.2d 1338, 1344 (5th Cir. 1988)
(quoting Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. at 102).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Clorox Co., 117 F.3d at 56.
85. Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1413 (9th Cir. 1991).
86. Id.
87. Nat’l Bancard Corp. v. VISA, U.S.A., Inc., 596 F. Supp. 1231, 1257 (S.D. Fla. 1984).
88. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. at 97.
89. Id. (citation omitted)
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of procompetitive effect.90 Therefore, excluded businesses and student-athletes would be required to prove that the procompetitive effects of the broad
or undefined restrictions on businesses could be achieved by less restrictive
alternatives that would have a substantially lesser impact on competition.
The NCAA’s procompetitive goals of efficiency, increased output, and
reduced price could be achieved by less restrictive means. The NCAA’s
broad or undefined restrictions on businesses can be achieved by less restrictive options, such as limiting their restrictions to companies that conduct business in industries that are problematic by nature and companies
that have been involved in prior NCAA recruiting infractions.91 Limiting
the NCAA’s restrictions to these categories of businesses would have substantially less of an impact on competition. The NCAA’s broad or undefined restrictions on businesses are too broad, burdensome, and unnecessary
to achieve its procompetitive goals. Also, limiting the NCAA’s restrictions
to this class of businesses will achieve the NCAA’s procompetitive goals.
Although not the least restrictive option, barring such companies from doing business with student-athletes would preserve the NCAA’s adherence to
its guiding principles while still being able to achieve its procompetitive
goals.
Industries that are problematic by nature may include gambling/sportsbetting, alcohol and tobacco, and adult entertainment. Companies operating
in these industries conduct business that is problematic by nature because of
the implied conflicts with ethics, morality, and religion.92 However, these
industries also have legal implications as they are generally governed by
differing state laws and regulations regarding legalization and minimum age
requirements for participating and conducting business in such industries.93
Gaming law continues to evolve with many states expanding legalized
gaming. But each state has different gambling laws, with some banning
gambling in its entirety and others fully legalizing and regulating casinos
and gambling.94 Federally, the minimum legal drinking age is twenty-one
years.95 Moreover, some states restrict the sale of certain tobacco products
or implement tobacco bans such as smoke-free laws prohibiting smoking in
certain public areas.96 In addition, regulation of the adult entertainment in90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See Jeffrey Moriarty, Business Ethics, STANFORD ENCYC. OF PHIL. (Nov. 17, 2016),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-business/#VariBusiEthi.
93. See Gambling Law: An Overview, L. INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/gambling (last visited Sept. 7, 2021).
94. See Nevada Casinos, ONLINE U.S. CASINOS, https://www.onlineunitedstatescasinos.com/
states/nevada-gambling (last visited Sept. 14, 2021).
95. Age 21 Minimum Legal Drinking Age, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/alcohol/fact-sheets/
minimum-legal-drinking-age.htm (last updated Sept. 3, 2020).
96. See Smokefree Air Laws, AM. LUNG ASS’N, https://www.lung.org/policy-advocacy/tobacco/smokefree-environments/smokefree-air-laws (last updated Dec. 10, 2020).
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dustry has generally been limited to prevent child pornography, and the
failure to abide by such regulation may result in civil and criminal prosecutions.97 Still, adult entertainment may be perceived as obscene and indecent
under society’s standards.98 Thus, the NCAA may achieve its procompetitive goals in a less restrictive manner by limiting its exclusions to companies that operate in problematic industries.
Instead of potentially excluding a broad category of businesses by implementing undefined restrictions to achieve its procompetitive goals, the
NCAA could achieve those goals by narrowly excluding those companies
who have committed NCAA recruiting infractions in the past. This less restrictive alternative would increase competition in the market by allowing
more businesses to compensate student-athletes for use of their NIL while
also barring companies that have violated NCAA’s recruiting rules in the
past. As a result, limiting the NCAA’s restrictions in this way would have
the same procompetitive effects that the NCAA proffers including enhanced
efficiency, increased output, and reduced price.
Limiting restrictions to those companies involved in past recruiting infractions would have a substantially lesser impact on competition because it
narrows the broad scope of businesses, and more concretely, specifies a
category of businesses that may be excluded from compensating studentathletes for use of their NIL. In addition, considering whether a business
has been involved with NCAA recruiting infractions in the past, in conjunction with whether the business operates in an industry problematic in nature, creates a more “bright-line rule” for the NCAA and businesses seeking
to contract student-athletes for use of their NIL. The less restrictive alternative also eliminates arbitrary case-by-case determinations of whether broad
or undefined restrictions apply to certain businesses in violation of the
NCAA’s guiding principles. Therefore, considering all the factors in the
burden-shifting test under the rule of reason analysis, the broad or undefined restrictions on businesses seeking to compensate student-athletes for
use of their NIL unreasonably impairs competition.
III. THE SUPREME COURT’S RULING AND DICTA FROM NCAA V.
ALSTON REJECTED THE PROPOSITION THAT THE NCAA IS
IMMUNE FROM FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW
On June 21, 2021, the United States Supreme Court unanimously ruled
that the NCAA’s attempt to limit compensation to student-athletes to preserve their amateur status violates antitrust law and is subject to the normal
97. See Corita R. Grudzen & Peter R. Kerndt, The Adult Film Industry: Time to Regulate?,
NCBI (June 19, 2007), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1892037.
98. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
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rule of reason analysis applied in antitrust cases.99 However, the Court’s
ruling was perceived as rather narrow, as it only overturned those NCAA
rules that restrict the amount that schools can compensate student-athletes
for education-related benefits.100 Still, the implications of Alston have
called into question the NCAA’s ability to limit compensation to studentathletes in other areas, particularly NIL, and will continue to influence the
course of NCAA amateurism rules in the coming years.
In Alston, the Court held that the district court did not err in finding
that the NCAA violated the Sherman Act by limiting the education-related
benefits schools could offer student-athletes, such as rules limiting scholarships for graduate or vocational school, payments for academic tutoring, or
paid post-eligibility internships.101 The Court went on to hold that the district court properly applied a rule of reason analysis and nowhere required
the NCAA to show that its compensation rules constituted the least restrictive means of preserving consumer demand, and it was only after finding
that the restraints were stricter than necessary to achieve demonstrated
procompetitive benefits that the district court declared a violation of the
Sherman Act.102 The Court sustained the district court’s analysis of the impact of the NCAA’s restrictions on education-related benefits because the
analysis was based upon “an exhaustive factual record, a thoughtful legal
analysis consistent with established antitrust principles, and a healthy dose
of judicial humility.”103
Notably, in Justice Kavanaugh’s concurrence, he powerfully maintained that “the NCAA and its member colleges are suppressing the pay of
student-athletes who collectively generate billions of dollars in revenues for
colleges every year.”104 Justice Kavanaugh stressed the importance of the
Court’s holding that the normal rule of reason analysis be applied to NCAA
rules restricting the compensation of student-athletes.105 Justice Kavanaugh
took his antitrust analysis further, concluding that “the NCAA’s business
model would be flatly illegal in almost any other industry in America [because] [n]owhere else in America can businesses get away with agreeing
not to pay their workers a fair market rate on the theory that their product is
defined by not paying their workers a fair market rate . . . The NCAA is not
above the law.”106
99. Samuel Estreicher & Zachary Fasman, NCAA v. Alston: A Brave New World for College
Sports, VERDICT (June 25, 2021), https://verdict.justia.com/2021/06/25/ncaa-v-alston-a-bravenew -world-for-college-sports.
100. Id.
101. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141, 2166 (2021).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 2168 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
105. Id. at 2167.
106. See NCAA v. Alston Signals Peril for the NCAA’s Amateurism Defense But Implications
for Antitrust Go Well-Beyond Collegiate Sports, CROWELL & MORING, LLP (June 23, 2021),
https://www.crowell.com/NewsEvents/AlertsNewsletters/all/NCAA-v-Alston-Signals-Peril-for-
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Although Alston was not about NIL rights, the impact of Alston will
likely influence the application of the Sherman Act. Not only will Alston
likely become a go-to decision for framing the Sherman Act’s rule of reason analysis, but, for the first time, the Court recognized that restraints can
also be exonerated with a “quick look” approach—a lower antitrust standard of review.107 The Court explained, for example, that agreements which
are needed to produce a sports league—such as the number of players and
the time of play, but not wages—could pass muster with a quick look, providing an especially powerful tool to joint venture participants.108 Yet, a
quick-look analysis does not extend to restrictions on “pay-for-play,” which
requires a more detailed analysis of the impact of those rules on the product
or consumer market.109
The Court also suggested that precedent may be flexible in antitrust
cases to reflect industry changes over time. In Alston, the NCAA relied in
part on NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., the Supreme Court’s
1984 NCAA case in which the Court stated that “the preservation of the
student-athlete in higher education . . . is entirely consistent with the goals
of the Sherman Act.”110 “After dismissing the comment as dicta, the Court
added that the analysis of whether conduct is an antitrust violation may
change as ‘market realities’ change.”111 In Alston, the Court concluded that
market realities had changed, noting in part the astronomical increase in
revenue associated with the NCAA’s athletic programs without explaining
how changes in revenue are relevant to the antitrust analysis.112
Lastly, on June 30, 2021, the NCAA’s Board of Directors adopted an
interim rule change that opened the door for student-athletes to begin engaging in NIL activity.113 The temporary rule change instructs schools to
set their own policy for what should be allowed regarding NIL rights with
minimal guidelines. Accordingly, on July 1, 2021, six state laws pertaining
to student-athlete NIL compensation went into effect.114 As a result, some
prominent NCAA student-athletes have begun to sign endorsement deals in
those states with active NIL legislation.

the-NCAAs-Amateurism-Defense-But-Implications-for-Antitrust-Go-Well-Beyond-CollegiateSports.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. at 120.
111. See CROWELL & MORING, LLP, supra note 106.
112. See CROWELL & MORING, LLP, supra note 106.
113. See Dan Murphy, Everything You Need to Know About the NCAA’s NIL Debate, ESPN
(Sept. 1, 2021), https://www.espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id/31086019/everything-need-knowncaa-nil-debate.
114. Id.
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CONCLUSION
Congress enacted the Sherman Act to disallow conspiracies between
businesses that would ultimately harm competition by causing higher prices
in connection with goods and services and creating unreasonable restraints
on trade in the marketplace. Student-athletes and third parties would likely
be successful in bringing a suit against the NCAA under Section One of the
Sherman Act because the NCAA’s implementation of broad or undefined
restrictions involves interstate commerce and two or more parties. In addition, under the rule of reason analysis, the NCAA’s broad or undefined
restrictions unreasonably harms competition. Even though the NCAA is
likely to establish procompetitive goals in implementing such restrictions,
student-athletes and third parties will likely show that such procompetitive
goals can be achieved in a less restrictive way. There are several less restrictive alternatives the NCAA could implement to achieve its procompetitive effect, including limiting its exclusion of businesses permitted to
compensate student-athletes for use of their NIL to companies operating in
industries that are problematic by nature and to companies who have been
cited for violating NCAA recruiting rules in the past. Broad or undefined
restrictions are too ambiguous and burdensome in determining what category of businesses are excluded from contracting with student-athletes.
Therefore, by limiting restrictions, the NCAA will achieve its procompetitive goals while also having less of an adverse effect on competition in the
marketplace. The Supreme Court’s ruling in Alston will also impact future
antitrust analysis and provides a blueprint for potential plaintiffs seeking
additional litigation regarding NIL rights for student-athletes.

